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Impact Calc - Transportation Racism Affirmative Transportation Racism 1ac observation One –

Impact Calc

1NC – AT – Impact Calculus

It is racist not to consider consequences – the only moral stance is to consider link turns and long-term effects.


, professor in the department of history at the University of Pennsylvania. He also teaches political science courses. Source: Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence (Apr.,


), pp. 728-739 Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381047

No one today would defend slavery, of course; but the more I thought about it, the clearer it seemed that before the Civil War one should have indeed tried to balance all the relevant considerations: that the institution of slavery was not so absolute an evil that it was morally imperative to do whatever was necessary to eradicate it immediately, without regard to any other consideration. In fact, if it was obvious that it would take a war-as it turned out, a long and gruesome war-to abolish slavery,

the suffering and anguish that that war would produce should


have been taken into account.

And one should have given some thought to what would happen to the ex-slaves, even in the event that the North were to win: if one could predict that there was a good chance that slavery would be replaced by another brutal and repressive system-by in fact the kind of system that took root in the South after Reconstruction- then this too should have been entered into the balance. And it also would have made sense to look at just how brutal the slave system was: there are different degrees of loathsomeness, and this could have made a difference in one's assessments. (Questions of degree are of course crucial if we are interested in striking a balance.) Finally,

arguments about peaceful alternatives

-the bidding up of the price of slaves by the federal government, for instance, to make the institution economically irrational in comparison with free labor-would certainly have had a place; historical experience-an analysis of the peaceful way slavery had in fact been ended in the British Empire is the most obvious case-might also have played a central role.

Why shouldn't these things all be taken into account? Are we so convinced of the rightness of our

personal moral

values that we can turn a blind eye to

the kinds of

considerations that might moderate the force of our commitment?

One wonders


whether it can ever



moral to


refuse to weigh

these sorts of

factors seriously

. One can take the argument a step further by means of a hypothetical example.


, in this case,



Southerners had told


abo- litionists that, if the North did come down to free the slaves

, before they arrived

the slaves would all be killed

. Certainly

at this point considerations other than the moral impermissibility of slavery would have to be taken into account

. In such a case,

an absolutist position-that the institution of slavery was so great an evil that it had to be rooted out without regard to consequence-reveals itself as

inhuman and, indeed, as

morally pre- posterous

. There has to be some point where issues of balance become morally salient; and thus in general these basic moral issues have to be approached in nonabsolutist-and by that I mean more than just non- deontological-terms.

Extinction is the worst impact—prioritizing anything else puts the cart before the horse



(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the

predicament. I have pointed out that

our species is the most important of all the things

that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though

in making our decision about ex- tinction

we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand,

and the survival of the species,

on the other. For

the species

not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room,

or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

2NC – Impact Calc Extensions

Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life


, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter


, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one

. Even

the most radical postmodernist


acknowledge the distinction between


existence and non-existenc


. As I have said, postmodernists accept that

there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the


meanings we ascribe



. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial.

We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear

. What doesn't exist can manifest no character

. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But

we need not doubt the simple idea that

a prerequisite of expression is existence

. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world

-in all its diverse embodiments-

must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters,

in some fashion,

of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity

. In fact,

if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative

and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless

, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept

the value of preserving the



. The nonhuman

is the extreme "other

"; it stands in contradistinction to humans

as a species

. In understanding



quality of human experience and

the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of

respecting the "other


" At the very least, respect

must involve ensuring


the "other



continues to exist


In our day and age,

this requires us to take responsibility for protecting

the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over

the earth


s diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.
Consequentialism is key to ethical decision making, because it ensures beings are treated as equal—any other approach to ethics is arbitrary because it considers one’s preferences as more important than others

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-2.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo.


some of the historically most prominent




status of judgements

about simple cases

depends on

their derivability from

basic ethical principles

(plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason.

The first

of these

is that we ought to promote our own good


The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (

or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor,

no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together

, Sidgwick takes

these axioms



a form of



We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal


iv It follows that the

rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings.

To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess

. When understood along these lines,

consequentialism is

by definition

a global ethics

: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter

. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.
Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it’s the only impact you can’t recover from.


, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology,


, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71


beingfor is


living towardsthefuture

: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind.

The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but

it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretchingtoward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived

. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this notyet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly another Other, that life can be lived  not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the alltoofamiliar unsureofitself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte'  both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of being fu filled, but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its unfu filment. One may say that the paradox of hope (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the beingfor is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and selfdefeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a mystery. And beingfortheOther, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view  makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place  but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the beingfor may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is unspoken, the responsibility undertaken is unconditional; it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery  noted Max Frisch  (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed  soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'


Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to

the musicalchairs game of

the real and the potential

 it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open

and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the must of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of beingfor. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition  an end to itself. Without knowing  without being capable of knowing  that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness ( the beingfor togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and preempting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place.


togetherness of beingfor is always in the future

, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The beingfor starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted.

This is the tragedy of beingfor  the reason why it cannot but be deathbound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction

. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end.

Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities

, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love.

The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end

, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied.

Morality, like the future itself, is forever notyet

. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the beingwith) that we turn into moral selves. And

it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally


and sometimes even of being good,

in the present

You’re responsible for the plan’s consequences – if we win our impact, moral rules should be suspended


, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, July


, Ethics, Vol 104, No 4

Even Nozick, a staunch absolutist, allows that

cases of "catastrophic



" may

require suspension of absolute



.(18) Attention to the dire consequences that may be brought about by allegiance to absolute rules needn't move us to the consequentialist camp--it didn't incline Ross or Nozick in that direction, for instance. But it does create a presumptive case against absolutism. Absolutist responses to the argument standardly take one of two forms. The first is to reject premise (1) and deny that absolutism generates tragic consequences, by arguing that a set of suitably narrowed absolutist rules will not require behavior that results in "catastrophic moral horror." The second response is to reject premise (2) and defend the moral necessity of obedience even if tragic consequences ensue. Rejecting Premise (1) Consider the first strategy. This is tantamount to a specificationist program that begins by admitting that the standard candidates--don't kill, lie, cheat, commit adultery--cannot plausibly be construed as absolute rules. Just as we had to narrow their scope if we were to show them universally relevant, so too we need to narrow the scope of such properties to show them universally determinative. The question, though, is how far, and in what way, this added concreteness is to be pursued. The double dangers that the absolutist must avoid at this juncture are those of drawing the grounding properties too broadly, or too narrowly. Rules drawn too narrowly will incorporate concrete details of cases in the description of the grounding properties, yielding a theory that is particularist in all but name. The opposite problem is realized when we allow the grounding properties to be drawn broadly enough as to be repeatably instantiated, but at the cost of allowing the emerging rules to conflict. Some middle ground must be secured. How could we frame an absolute rule that enjoined just the actions we want, while offering an escape clause for tragic cases? There seems to be no way to do this other than by appending a proviso to the rule, to the effect that it binds except where such obedience will lead to catastrophic consequences, very serious harm, horrific results. Because of the great variety of ways in which such results can occur, there doesn't seem to be any more precise way to specify the exceptive clause without reducing it to an indefinitely long string of too-finely described scenarios. Is this problematic? Consider an analogous case. Someone wants to lose weight and wants to know how long to maintain a new diet. A dietician offers the following advice: "Cut twenty percent of your caloric intake; this will make you thinner, but also weaker. If you reach a point where you've gotten too thin and weak, increase your calories." The dietician's advice is flawed because it doesn't give, by itself, enough information to the person trying to follow it. It's too general. The qualified moral rule is similarly uninformative. If abiding by the rule will occasion harmful results, one wants to know how harmful they have to be to qualify as too harmful. The rule doesn't really say--`catastrophic' is just a synonym for `too harmful'. Such a rule is crucially underspecific, and this undermines efforts to apply it as a major premise in deductive moral argument. This lack of specificity results from an absence of necessary and sufficient conditions that could determine the extension of the concept "catastrophic consequences."(19) Efforts to remove this underspecificity by providing a set of definitional criteria typically serve only to falsify the resulting ethical assessments; imagine the futility of trying to precisely set out in advance what is to count as catastrophic consequences. Rendering the notion of "catastrophic" more precise seems bound to yield a rule that omits warranted exceptions. Or it may cover all such exceptions, but at the cost of making the exceptive clause so fine-grained that it will be nothing less than an indefinitely long disjunction of descriptions of actual cases that represent exceptions to the general rule. Neither option should leave us very sanguine about the prospects of specifying absolute rules so as to ensure that such rules can be obeyed without occasioning catastrophic consequences. Rejecting Premise (2) The alternative for the absolutist is to stand fast and allow that morality requires adherence to rules that will sometimes yield catastrophic horrors. There is no inconsistency in taking such a stand. But the ethic that requires conduct that is tantamount to failure to prevent catastrophe is surely suspect.

Preventing catastrophe is presumptively obligatory


The obligation might be defeasible, but absolutists have yet to tell the convincing story that would override the presumption.

Imagine that

you are a sharpshooter in a position to kill a terrorist

who is credibly

threatening to detonate a bomb that will kill thousands

. If you merely wound him, he will be able to trigger the firing mechanism. You must kill him to save the innocents. Suppose that

in obedience to an absolutist ethic

you refrain

from shooting. The terrorist detonates the bomb.

Thousands die


Something must be said about the agent whose obedience to absolute rules occasions catastrophe. It is possible that an absolutist ethic will blame you for doing your duty. Possible, but unlikely.


who allow that obedience to their favored rules may occasion catastrophe typically seek ways to exculpate those whose obedience yields tragic results. The standard strategy is to


some version of

the doctrine of double effect, or the doctrine of doing and allowing


The former says

that harms brought about by indirect intention may be permissible

even though similar harms brought about by direct intention are forbidden. The latter says that bringing about harm through omission or inaction may be permissible even though similar harms brought about by positive action are forbidden


The motivating spirit

behind both


is to legitimate

certain kinds of

harmful conduct, to exculpate


harm doers, and to forestall the possibility that absolute rules might conflict.

The truth of either doctrine would ensure that agents always have a permissible option to pursue--namely, obedience to an absolute moral rule.(20) Quite apart from the fact that these doctrines have yet to be adequately defended,(21) their adequate defense would still leave us short of a justification of the absolute rules that are to complement them.


of these




a defense of absolutism

; rather,

they are

really "

helping doctrines," whose truth would undermine the inevitability of conflict among absolute rules

. We may always have a permissible option in cases where we must choose between killing and letting die, intending death or merely foreseeing it, but

this by itself is no argument for thinking that the prohibition on intentionally killing innocents is absolute.

2014-07-19 18:44
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