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3) Forms of representative government: Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: what (if) makes the difference ?

Positive Political Theory:


Plan of presentations



Rules:



There are two cycles of presentations. Students are 27



In the first cycle ( 5th October-28 october) there are :



2 groups of 3 members



4 groups of 4 members



An individual presentation about coalition theory explicitly required by a student.



In the second cycle ( 4th November-25th November) there are



6 groups of 4 members



1 group of 3 members



Please fill in the following outline



EVERYBODY HAS TO PRESENT IN BOTH CYCLES. Students missing in the first cycle:




First Cycle ( 5th October-28 october)



5th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)



Group ………….

a)BELLETTI

b)CORBETTA

c)ROSSI

(1

) The Veto players approach

:

Tsebelis George (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press

CAP. 1 and 2

7th October 2010 (10.30-12.15)



Group ………….

a)PAUDICE

b)BINDA

c)ARNOLD

(2) Principal-agent theory in political science


Lupia Arthur “Delegation and its perils” in Strom, Mueller & Bergman (eds) “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy”

Moe Terry “The New Economics of Organization” in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 739-777



12th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)


Group ………….

a)NISCO

b)PARDO

c)BACCEGA

d)SELLERRING

(3) Forms of representative government: Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: what (if) makes the difference ?


Strom Kaare (2003), Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation in Strom, Mueller & Bergman (eds) “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy

Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press CAP 3

14th October 2008 (10.30-12.15)



  1. Group ………….


  2. a)CEPPARULO

  3. b)MOR

  4. c)GAMBERALE

  5. d)PIROLA

(4) Law making in Congress: legislative institutions explain policy output.. (1)

(2 presentations)

Required


Krehbiel, K., (1998) Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking Chicago,University of Chicago Press CAP 2°

Keith Krehbiel “Pivots” in In Donald Wittman and Barry Weingast (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cox G. & Mathew McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, Cambridge University Press, (2005) cap.2-3

19th October 2010 (8.30-10.15)



Group ………….

a)ALIAJ

b)PAN

c)RICCIARDI

d)MOLINARI

(5) Law making in Congress: legislative institutions explain policy output.. but what explains legislative institutions ? (2)



Weingast Barry and W. Marshall, (1988). The Industrial Organization of Congress, Journal of Political Economy

Aldrich John H., (1995) Why Parties ?, The University of Chicago Press, pp 24-45

Keith Krehbiel Legislative Organization in Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 18, Number 1—Winter 2004—Pages 113–128



21th October 2010 (10.30-12.15)



Group ………….

a)DI LONARDO

b)KENNALLY

(6) Making and breaking (parliamentary) governments (1)



Laver M. and Schofield N. (1991) Multiparty government, Oxford University Press 1991: 1-13.

Laver M. and Shepsle K., (1996) Making and breaking governments, Cambridge University Press (p. 61-89) or

,

Schofield, N. 1993. Political Competition in Multiparty Coalition Governments, European Journal of Political Research 23: 1-33.

28th October 2010 (10.30-12.15)



Group ………….

a)MORCODEAN

b)KESHISHOGHLYAN

c)CHESHKOVA

d)…………………….

(7) Making and breaking (parliamentary) governments (2)



Tsebelis G. (2007) Coalition theory: a veto players approach (mimeo)

Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press CAP 9

4th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)



  1. Group ………….


  2. a)RICCI

  3. b)RASTRELLI

  4. c)ROCCA

  5. d)PISATI

(8) Law making in Parliament: what makes the Cabinet powerful or weak?



Tsebelis George (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press CAP 4 and 7

Cox Gary W (2006) The Organization of Democratic Legislatures, In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Press.

Second cycle



5th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)



  1. Group ………….


  2. a)MORCODEAN

  3. b)KESHISHOGHLYAN

  4. c)CHESHKOVA

  5. d)ROSSI

(9) Cabinet, delegation and lawmaking


Thies, Michael F. 2001. "Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments." American Journal of Political Science 45: 580-598.

Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." American Political Science Review 99: 93-106

9th November 2010 (8.30-12.15)

Group ………….

a)BACCEGA

b)GAMBERALE

c)CEPPARULO

d) BINDA

(10) Cabinet governance

Lupia Arthur & Kaare Strom 2008 “Bargaining , Transaction costs and Coalition Governance” in eds Strom, Mueller and Bergman Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining:The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe” , Oxford University Press

Mueller Wolfgang & Kaare Strom 2008 “Coalition agreements and Cabinet Governance” in eds Strom, Mueller and Bergman Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining:The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe” , Oxford University Press


11st November 2010 (10.30-12.15)

  1. Group ………….


  2. a)NISCO

  3. b)PARDO

  4. c)MOR

  5. d)PAUDICE

(11) Bicameralism and Referendum


Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press CAP 5 and 6

16th November 2010 (8.30-12.15)



  1. Group ………….


  2. a)KENNALLY

  3. b)DI LONARDO

  4. c)PISATI.

  5. d)BELLETTI

(12) Veto players and macroeconomic effects.


Tsebelis George, (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press CAP 8


18th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)



Group ………….

a)PIROLA

b)MOLINARI

c)JANSSENS.

d)CORBETTA

(13) Judges, Bureaucrats and Politicians: When and why do judges and bureaucrats influence political outcomes? (1)



Tsebelis George (2002) Veto Players. How political institutions work. Princeton University Press Ch.10.

Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. (2002) Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch.4, 7.

)


23rd November 2010 (8.30-12.15)



Group ………….

a)RICCI

b)RASTRELLI

c)ROCCA

d)ARNOLD

(14) Judges, Bureaucrats and Politicians: When and why do judges and bureaucrats influence political outcomes? (2)



Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy." American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 407-23

Shipan, Charles R. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence." American Political Science Review 98: 467-480.

25th November 2010 (10.30-12.15)



Group ………….

a)RICCIARDI

b)ALIAJ

c)…………………….

(15) Judges, Bureaucrats and Politicians: When and why do judges and bureaucrats influence political outcomes? (3)



Steunenberg, Bernard. 1997. "Courts, Cabinet and Coalition Parties: The Politics of Euthanasia in a Parliamentary Setting." British Journal of Political Science 27: 551-571.

30th November 2010 (8.30-10.15)



Final/intermediate exam

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